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Why might presidential succession in partly- and non-democratic regimes render
the probability of democratic transition more likely? Many presidential regimes in
developing world are highly personalist and their stability depends on the strength
of their rulers. Transitions are often initiated and driven by elite splits, and the
process of presidential succession triggers these splits and uncertainty along the chain
of command. Building upon previous work on liberalizing elections (Howard and
Roessler 2006), I ﬁnd that presidential designated successors lose elections more often
than the long-standing incumbents, which increases the probability of democratic
change, since the former compete against the pro-democratic opposition in a recent,
1990-2004 period. I also ﬁnd that the presence of hegemonic parties mitigates these
eﬀects.
I would like to thank Marc M. Howard and Philip Roessler for generously sharing their data on
liberalizing electoral outcomes with me. I also wish to thank Ken Benoit, Jos Elkink, Julia Gray, Slava
Mikhailov and Matthew Wall for their insightful comments.Introduction
After nearly two decades in oﬃce, on 7 January 2001 President Rawlings of Ghana stepped
down, passing power to the pro-democratic opposition after his designated successor and
Vice-President Atta Mills lost a second round of the December 2000 presidential election,
despite the support of the ruling party, military, media and the outgoing president himself.
One of the most important elements of this contest was that the charismatic incumbent
Rawlings who won two elections in the past did not run due to term limits (Gyimah-Boadi
2001, 107). Indeed, in the 2000 elections ‘a great wave of excitement swept the country
with President Rawlings no longer on the ballot paper, and the scent of change in the air.’1
The hopes of the Ghanian electorate were not unfounded, as Rawlings’s successor indeed
lost, and, following the election, Ghana’s Freedom House ranking was changed from ‘Partly
Free’ to ‘Free’. Does presidential succession in partly- and non-democratic regimes render
the probability of democratic transition more likely and why?
Throughout history, the failure to achieve smooth transitions of power brought havoc
to the governments. The need to transfer power has been an important component of
promoting the rise of new political patterns (Burling 1974, 2). Political stability, long-
term economic policy and growth, international alliances, and, as this paper argues, the
very success of transitions to democracy are aﬀected by political decisions that rulers take
during succession and how they depart from power.
In this paper I focus on one important aspect of transition in presidential regimes: the
eﬀects of presidential succession on democratic change. I investigate whether successors are
more likely to lose elections than the long-standing incumbents and whether it aﬀects the
1IRIN. 2004, November 26. ‘Kufuor Likely to Be Re-elected in Ghana’.
2probability of democratic transitions. When presidents the world over present themselves
for re-election, they are more likely to win. But when incumbents step down, very often
they designate their successors in their stead. They can select from the ranks of their own
party (Mexico under PRI), their relatives (Azerbaijan 2003, Syria 2000), public oﬃcials or
people they share business interests with (Ukraine 2004). But they often do so at the peril
of their regime.
I argue that, when presidents appoint successors in nondemocratic or partly democratic
regimes, the uncertainty in the ruling coalition over whether rents will continue to be
distributed as well as over whether designated successors are strong enough to deter or
punish potential challengers often causes elite splits. This, in turn, makes an opposition
victory more likely. Transitions to democracy almost always result from splits within
authoritarian regimes, as many researchers have noted (Di Palma 1990; Karl 1990; Kitschelt
1986; Meyer 2004; Przeworski 1991; Stepan 1986). I test this argument empirically, focusing
on 90 elections in partly- and non-democratic presidential regimes, from 1990 to 2004. I
ﬁnd that longstanding incumbents obtain more votes and are less likely to lose elections
than their designated successors, and that democratic transitions occur more often when
incumbents step down and successors run in elections in their stead. I also ﬁnd that the
presence of hegemonic parties somewhat reduces the handicaps of successors.
The ﬁndings of this paper suggest that defeats at so-called ‘stunning elections’ are
driven not only by the opposition’s mobilization, but also by the absence of incumbent
that reduces the costs of the collective action. This follows the work of Geddes (1999) and
Huntington (1991), who have argued that the absence of a leader due to the incapacity
or death of a personalist ruler often precipitates elite splits and eases collective action
problems within the opposition. The broader implication is that democracy practitioners
3should focus their attention not only on free and fair elections, but also on the executive
tenure restrictions and the observance thereof.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I elaborate on the process of presidential succes-
sion and why it aﬀects democratic transitions in presidential regimes in developing world.
To put it simply, I expect incumbents to win, and designated successors to lose. To put it
simply, I expect incumbents to win, and designated successors to lose. Next I discuss how
I build upon the data on liberalizing electoral outcomes (Howard and Roessler 2006) and
present the results of logit and OLS estimations and discuss the impact of incumbency on
the probability of democratic change. I then focus on the outlier cases in which incumbents
ran and lost or successors ran and won in order to illuminate the causal mechanism and
see whether theory holds under adverse conditions.
Succession, Incumbency and Democratic Transitions
The most dangerous time in oﬃce for the presidents is the ﬁrst one or two years in oﬃce
(Bienen and Van der Walle 1991). Earlier studies on political survival found that leaders,
once they survive the initial stage in oﬃce, have an incumbency advantage over their
challengers (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Bienen and van der Walle 1991). Likewise,
Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) found that among presidents who faced elections without
impending term limits only 27 per cent were defeated, and the rest either won them or
did not run. It seems that incumbents are more diﬃcult to defeat in elections than other
electoral candidates. Incumbent reelection goes beyond the personal concerns of presidents
and their challengers, however, and has larger implications for the fate of the country’s
political system.
4Democracy is the only form of government that is designed to arrange for an orderly
succession of leaders. In contrast, when a dictator dies, very often ‘war of all against all’
follows and the strongest contender emerges as a new dictator. The diﬀerence between suc-
cession in dictatorships as described by the public choice literature (e.g., Kurrild-Klitgaard
2000; Tullock 1987) and succession in modern presidential regimes lies in the fact that the
latter is legitimated by elections. Often described as electoral authoritarian regimes (Lev-
itsky and Way 2002; Ottaway 2003; Schedler 2002), these, unlike democratic regimes, in
which ex ante electoral uncertainty is one of the inherent features of democracy (Przeworski
and Limongi 1997), are designed to prevent electoral defeats through fraud or intimidation
of the opponents (Schedler 2002, 37). When incumbents step down for whatever reason,
elections are supposed to facilitate an orderly succession by conferring legitimacy on the
new ruler. These regimes oscillate between democracy and dictatorship, and can gravi-
tate to either, or remain in between. The outcomes of succession impact on their future
democratic development.
The issue of succession is the most severe problem for dictatorships throughout recorded
history and the hereditary succession is the most stable form of succession for dictatorships
(Egorov and Sonin 2005; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Tullock 1987). A dictator cannot appoint
his successor in advance without undermining his own authority. If it were, everyone would
coordinate around the latter and then the ﬁrst position would be endangered (Burling
1974).
In the majority of cases, the inherent uncertainty of succession triggered inﬁghting and
political instability. When Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi decided not to participate
in the 2002 elections and obey term limits, he designated Uhuru Kenyatta as his successor.
The absence of incumbent running made the president himself and the regime insiders
5less motivated to spend large amounts of money on the electoral campaign and led to
splits within the governing party, KANU, among those who wanted to choose their own
presidential candidate and those standing by the incumbent’s choice (Howard and Roessler
2006; Throup 2003). Presidential succession in Zambia was even messier, with two former
vice presidents — Godfrey Miyanda and Genenarl Christon Tembo — running against
another former vice president, Mwanawasa, who was selected as the governing party’s
presidential candidate for the 2001 elections (Burnell 2001). Similarly, despite appointing
his Prime Minister as his successor in Ukraine in 2004, President Leonid Kuchma failed to
transfer his enormous powers to the former and remained in ﬁrm control until his departure.
The united and strong opposition increased the costs of suppression, while regime elites
became split between supporters of the designated successor and those that hesitated up
until the last moment. This ultimately led to a democratic breakthrough in Ukraine.
Thus, I put forward the following hypothesis:
• H1: Successors are more likely to lose elections than incumbents. The corollary of this
hypothesis is that I expect successors to gain lower number of votes than incumbents,
all things being equal.
In the absence of strong institutions in personalist presidential regimes, rewards and
the access to rents depend on the access to a president, in the words of Robert Bates (2001,
72), “the fountain of privilege.” If some elite groups are not conﬁdent in their continuing
access to rents under a new ruler, or unsure of a new ruler’s ability to provide rents, they
are likely to designate an alternative candidate instead, or even place bets on several likely
winners.
However, the very uncertainty of elections creates focal point for societal coordination
6and enables the horizontal communication that is needed for the collective action (Barzel
2002). In turn, the latter often produces the so-called ’stunning elections’ phenomenon,
in which a suddenly mobilized opposition inﬂicts a surprising defeat on a non-democratic
regime (Huntington 1991, 175-80; Markoﬀ 1996, 113-4; Thompson and Kuntz 2004).
The absence of a long-standing ruler compounds uncertainty and increases the prob-
ability of democratic change through the following process. Firstly, rulers are at their
weakest in the initial period (Bienen and Van der Walle 1991), when they still have to
prove their strength, neutralize challengers, accumulate resources for their coalitions and
gain experience in oﬃce. Designated successors are about to live through this dangerous
period and hence are more vulnerable than longer-serving rulers. Secondly, in the absence
of strong institutions in personalist presidential regimes (later on I also check whether
hegemonic parties ease the costs of succession), rewards and the access to rents depend on
the access to a leader (Bates 2001; Geddes 1999). If some elite groups are not conﬁdent in
their continuing access to rents under the new ruler, or unsure of a new ruler’s ability to
provide rents, they are likely to designate an alternative candidate instead. Thirdly, am-
bitious politicians could feel they are capable of defeating a weaker candidate and gaining
oﬃce for themselves, something that they would not dare under the old ruler. For exam-
ple, politicians that failed to obtain party presidential nomination represented very serious
threat to hegemonic party regime in Mexico (Magaloni 2006, 258). In turn, elite splits will
compound the electoral uncertainty and increase chances for regime’s defeat. Finally, elite
splits and succession could aﬀect the chances for democratic change indirectly, via easing
the collective action and breaking the apathy of a population through the novelty eﬀects
of new candidates.
Why would this process necessarily lead to a democratic transition? The incumbents or
7their designated successors, as representatives of the status quo (stability of partly- or non-
democratic regime), run against the opposition that, in turn, challenges this status quo.
Most of the time, and especially after the end of the Cold War this challenge came from the
groups espousing democratic values rather than socialist, nationalist or pro-independence
creeds, like they did in earlier periods (McFaul 2002; Przeworski in Munck and Snyder
2007).2
If designated successors are more likely to lose, then the absence of incumbents can
be seen as the cause of democratic change during elections. However, if rulers step down
because they simply cannot run, then their absence is the result of increasing regime
democratization rather than its cause. While some presidents do not face restrictions on
the number of terms they can serve (Syria, Egypt), the majority face term limits and have
to step down. However, many term-bound presidents extend their terms and proceed to win
elections: for example, in Uganda in 2005, Belarus in 2004, Gabon in 2003 or Togo in 2002.
These rulers did not designate successors, elite splits were absent and democratic change
did not occur. If these rulers had stepped down and initiated succession, the likelihood of
transition would have gone up only because of their absence, as argued above.
The absence of incumbents, however, is also a manifestation of the overall regime liber-
alization. Presidential succession causes elite splits but it also, as described by an observer
of the Ghanaian politics in the beginning of this paper, changes the expectations about the
likely electoral outcomes and the overall political environment. On average, the Freedom
House civil liberties index in a two-year period before an “incumbent” election is 5.1 and
2McFaul (2002) proposed that the origins of democracy as the ideology of opposition could be under-
stood if one took into account the balance of ideologies in the international system at the time (1980-90s).
Likewise, Adam Przeworski contemplated that after the disastrous experience with the military dictator-
ships in Latin America, the opposition (the left) came to realize the importance of democracy as the value
in itself (Przeworski cited in Munck and Snyder, 2007 forthcoming, 24). Similar argument was advanced
by Castaneda (1993).
8with “successor” it is 4.2, where higher values represent less open environment. If ruler
steps down, he or she does not subvert the constitutional process by extending the term,
which also contributes to overall liberalization, for which I account in the empirical section
of this paper. It is also in the interests of the departing ruler to leave oﬃce for a more
democratic setting where his interests as a private citizen are not at the mercy of the all-
powerful ruler to be. In this sense, while the absence of incumbent is both the cause of
the electoral breakthrough and the manifestation of the overall democratization, it is the
multifaceted process of presidential succession that causes democratic change directly and
indirectly.
This leads us to a further hypothesis:
• H2: The fact of successors running in elections (executive turnover) increases the
probability of democratic transitions. Since successors are more likely to lose than
incumbents, and since they are most likely to lose to the opposition groups espousing
democratic ideas, the fact whether an incumbent runs or not aﬀects the probability
of successful democratic transition.
What conditions might allow succession to take place in a more mannered fashion? In
the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, only a few rulers managed their orderly succession in
developing world (Herz 1952). However, succession does not always have to be unruly.
Sometimes it proceeds smoothly as a successor consolidates his or her power and becomes
a new incumbent (e.g., Russia 2000, Syria 2000, Azerbaijan 2003). The paradigmatic case
of a long-standing regime with an orderly presidential succession is Mexico. Indeed, while
Mexico has remained non-democratic for most of the 20th century, its presidents were
replaced every six years in Mexico. Castaneda (2000) described how Mexican presidents
chose their successors in a process called the dedazo (the ﬁnger tap): the former picked
9the ruler to be at his will, so that the incumbent was the only ‘voter’ deciding on the next
president.
If the presidents possessed such broad powers over succession, why did not they remain
incumbents and dedazo themselves instead? The 1917 constitution banned presidential re-
election, and when president Alvaro Obregon (1920-24) avoided this ban, winning a second
term, he was subsequently assassinated in 1928. Following this, the Mexican elites estab-
lished a new umbrella party, PRI, as a collective agreement to prevent one single individual
from becoming dictator (Hall 1990). The assassination of Obregon created a powerful focal
point for coordination against possible reelection attempts in the future (Magaloni 2006,
8). The all-powerful party, combined with the speciﬁc institutional agreement, placed in-
surmountable constraints on the executive should the latter decide to prolong his rule,
lowered the stakes of losing oﬃce, and, by making regime elites into stakeholders of the
status quo, largely prevented the splits during succession.
Brownlee (2004) focused on regime stability and breakdown as functions of elite unity
and defections, which, in turn, depended on whether ruling political parties were capable
of mediating inter-elite conﬂicts. Magaloni (2006) and Smith (2005) explored the determi-
nants of stability of hegemonic party regimes and found that hegemonic parties mediated
elite conﬂicts and perpetuated these regimes beyond the lives of individual rulers.
We can state these propositions in our last hypothesis:
• H3: Hegemonic parties reduce probability of democratic transition during presidential
succession.
To sum it up, elite splits are almost always precipitate transition to democracy. Pres-
10idential succession often generates these splits, as elites are less likely to split under a
long-standing ruler than under designated successor. The fact whether incumbent or his
successor runs in elections aﬀects the probability of democratic change: successors are
more likely to lose than incumbents and they do so to the pro-democratic opposition. I
also expect that the presence of hegemonic parties mitigates these eﬀects.
Domestic and International Determinants of Transitions to Democ-
racy
I deﬁne incumbents as presidents that have been in oﬃce for at least one year prior to elec-
tions. Successors are presidential candidates from the same party as presidents, relatives,
or all those designated as successors and/or campaigned for by the departing presidents.
In all but three elections analyzed in this paper I was able to identify designated succes-
sors. The exceptions are cases in which incumbent presidents were ousted in coups or
were forced to resign and thus neither participated in elections nor designated successors.
Prime Ministers, Vice Presidents or other oﬃcials of the incumbent regime that run for
the presidency are deﬁned as successors.
In order to investigate the impact of incumbency on the probability of democratic
transitions, and to control for other determinants, I build upon a model from a recent paper
by Howard and Roessler (2006) that investigates the occurrences of so-called liberalizing
electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian regimes.3 Their paper takes into account
both the actor-driven and structural parameters that are likely to inﬂuence democratic
transitions. Crucially, one of the parameters in their model is the incumbent turnover —
3I would like to thank Marc M. Howard for generously sharing these data.
11whether an incumbent is present at elections or not.
Their sample contains 50 elections held in parliamentary and presidential electoral
autocracies in the period of 1990-02. Howard and Roessler operationalize competitive
autocracies by excluding those countries that received Freedom House (henceforth FH)’s
score of 2 or lower (democracies) — indeed, democracies do not need to democratize —
on the one hand, and those with the worst FH’s score of 7 (‘closed’ autocracies), and also
those where the winning party or candidate received over 70 per cent of the vote, on the
other hand (ibid, 368). That is, the authors focus on competitive, and exclude hegemonic
authoritarian regimes. They also exclude foundational elections. Some of the elections
occur in the same country twice or even three times. The dependent variable is liberalizing
electoral outcome (increases in the levels of democracy scores in election year: at least by
1 on FH score and by 3 on Polity score).
I build upon this dataset in the following manner. Firstly, I exclude elections in non-
presidential regimes (e.g., Albania, Singapore and Malaysia). Secondly, to the 35 presiden-
tial elections held in 1990-2002 I add 55 more elections from 1990-2004. The modiﬁed data
include 90 elections in all presidential regimes, even those with incumbents gaining more
than 70 per cent of votes. The sample now includes hegemonic authoritarian regimes, such
as Egypt, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. The reason behind the inclusion is twofold. Firstly,
the opposition might boycott certain elections, which would inﬂate executive vote shares
but does not necessarily render such regimes uncompetitive. For example, in 1996 elec-
tions in Zimbabwe the incumbent Mugabe gained 92.8 per cent after two main contenders
withdrew from the race in protest. Later, in the 2002 election, Mugabe gained 56.2 per
cent, even though the FH democracy scores deteriorated from 5 in 1996 to 6 in 2002.
Secondly, the 70 per cent cut point is rather arbitrary. Kyrgyzstan was not included in
12Howard and Roessler’s (2006) study, yet President Akayev, who gained 74.5 per cent in
2000 elections (above the 70 per cent threshold), was subsequently ousted after the 2005
elections in a splendid example of a liberalizing electoral outcome. The presidential succes-
sion of 2003 in Azerbaijan nearly resulted in another liberalizing electoral outcome despite
its high executive vote margins.
These broader criteria, however, leads to the inclusion of several non-competitive plebiscite
“elections” (Syria, Egypt), where the chances for democratic breakthrough are minuscule.
I additionally estimate the sample of elections below 75 per cent margins separately. Also, I
match the executive turnover with leaders at the time of elections and identify incumbents
and their designated successors. There are only three elections with both incumbents and
their designated successors absent (following military coups). I examine every election and
report the name of the incumbent and successor (Gleditsch, Goemans and Chiozza 2006),
as well as their electoral performance. Variable deﬁnitions and data sources are described
in appendix.
Thus, I re-estimate and re-specify the Howard and Roessler (2006) model, focusing
on succession in presidential regimes, and add hegemonic party and international democ-
racy diﬀusion variables. I also estimate an OLS regression, with votes cast for incum-
bent/successor as the dependent variable and using a number of new parameters that are
likely to aﬀect the vote.
The liberalizing electoral outcome is a function of whether a successor or an incum-
bent runs (Successor), opposition unity (Opposition coalition), the average number of
anti-governmental demonstrations in year prior to election and election year (Opposition
mobilization), economic factors (Growth), international and global factors (FDI ﬂows and
13Foreign Aid per capita, both averaged as above), Democracy as the regime’s average FH
civil liberties score for the two years prior to the election; Prior Liberalization: whether
regimes experienced changes on democracy score 5 years prior to elections. I refer the
reader to Howard and Roessler (2006) article for a more detailed discussion (ibid, 370-
74). Their major explanatory variable is the Unity of the Opposition. Thus, the model
includes actor-centered parameters, as well as economic and political structural factors and
is well-suited to test the impact of presidential succession on democratic transition while
controlling for other parameters.
The diﬀusion of ideas and policies across borders is a topic that has been of concern
to social sciences in the past several decades and has recently been tackled by political
methodologists.4 In a recent paper on diﬀusion of democracy, Gleditsch and Ward (2006)
employ a battery of parameters to measure diﬀusion, such as the proportion of democracies
locally and globally, as well as democratic transitions locally.
To account for the demonstration eﬀects of ‘stunning elections’, I add two new vari-
ables: Regional Liberalization and Regional Transitions. I count the number of liberalizing
outcomes in the region, 3 years prior to election.5. Clearly, the opposition’s eﬀorts to
mobilize and win elections in one country were triggered and mobilized by the success-
ful eﬀorts in other countries; the opposition activists traveled and shared their methods
and practices, international donor programs were designed according to the successfully
implemented ones, etc.6 (Carothers 2003; McFaul 2005).
[FIGURE 1 IS ABOUT HERE]
4Beck et al. 2006; Cederman and Gleditsch 2004; Darmofal 2006; Franzese and Hays 2006; Gleditsch
and Ward 2000, 2006; O’Loughlin et al. 1998.
5Regional groups are West Africa, Middle Africa, South Africa, East Africa, Middle East and North
Africa, CEE/NIS, Central America, South America, and Asia
6Washington Post. 2003, November 25. Tbilisi’s “Revolution of Roses” Mentored by Serbian Activists:
Foes of Milosevi´ c Trained Georgians, (by Peter Baker) Page A22.
14Figure One is a two-by-two matrix that plots the occurrence of democratic transitions
depending on whether incumbent or successor is running in elections. Four elections in
quadrants are included for illustrative purposes. In 67 elections, or 74 per cent of cases,
incumbents run in elections, and in 23 elections (26 per cent) incumbents do not run for
one reason or another. As can be seen, when an incumbent runs, a liberalizing electoral
outcome occurs in only 12 per cent of elections (8 cases) in presidential regimes (1990-
2004). In contrast, democratic breakthrough occurs in 52 per cent of elections (12 cases)
in which an incumbent does not run.
Comparing vote shares, we can see that even if incumbents lose, they still gain 7 per
cent more than losing successors, and when the former win, they perform better by 11
per cent, than winning successors. Overall, incumbents obtain 68.6 (18) v. successors’
49.9 (21) per cent of popular vote in the ﬁrst and/or only round. This diﬀerence could
be attributed to the fact that successors are weaker and thus gain fewer votes: because
they cannot commit electoral fraud on a suﬃciently large scale; or they lack resources to
rally and buy their supporters or to provide goods for their winning coalition; or because
of unusually high international pressure.
While the size of fraud is diﬃcult to estimate, the Database of Political Institutions,
DPI (Beck et al. 2001) includes a variable coded as 1 if allegations of fraud were reported.
On average, incumbents win 71.5 v. 66.1 per cent in fraudulent v. ‘clean’ elections, while
successors gain 49 in ‘clean’ and only 43.8 per cent in fraudulent elections. While we
should treat these data with caution, it could also indicate that successors are less adept
at manipulating the ballot when there is uncertainty along the chain of command.
15Model Estimation and Discussion
Models 1 – 4 are speciﬁed as logit regressions, with a binary dependent variable denoting
democratic change or not. Model 5 is an OLS regression with per cent of votes cast for
the executive (incumbent or his successor) in ﬁrst and or only round (Beck et al. 2001) as
the dependent variable. Models 1 – 3 are estimated on the same estimation sample. All
four models are speciﬁed with robust (cluster-adjusted) standard errors. Unit of analysis
is election.
The ﬁrst, ‘base’ model follows the speciﬁcation in the original Howard and Roessler
(2006) article, extending the sample to 90 elections in presidential regimes, with robust
(cluster-adjusted) standard errors. Like in their estimation, the unity of the opposition,
incumbent turnover and mobilization have statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects. In fact, in all
three logit models (1 – 3), when Successor runs instead of incumbent, the probability
of democratic change increases. Likewise, when the opposition is united, the probability
increases in all three speciﬁcations. Economic growth exerts a negative inﬂuence on demo-
cratic transitions: economic performance helps to sustain regimes in power the world over
(Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 302-9). Likewise, low levels of democracy reduce the
chances for change — no doubt, democratic breakthrough was much nigher in Ukraine of
2004, with democracy levels of 4 (on a seven-point scale, with the 7 being the worst score),
than in neighboring Belarus with its score of 6.
[TABLE 1 IS ABOUT HERE]
Models Two and Three are estimated on the basis of the same sample of 90 elections in
presidential regimes (1990-2004). In Model Two I test the impact of the hegemonic party
on electoral outcomes. Clearly, the presence of the hegemonic party reduces the chances
16for democratic change. The eﬀects of Successor remain signiﬁcant, however, whether the
former runs in a hegemonic-party regime or not. In Model Three I add two ‘diﬀusion’ pa-
rameters, indicating overall regional levels of democracy and instances of democratic tran-
sitions in the region. Clearly, demonstration eﬀects do seem to be at work: the Regional
Transitions variable is positively signiﬁcant, indicating that successful ‘stunning’ elections
in the region aﬀect the probability of similar elections nearby. Interestingly enough, pre-
ceding transitions in the region seem to cancel the eﬀects of preceding mobilization in the
country — the eﬀects of this variable become insigniﬁcant. The overall degree of Regional
Liberalization does not aﬀect democratic change, however. I perform the likelihood-ratio
test on these three models and the results indicate that the prediction is improved with
each new speciﬁcation. Model 4 is estimated on a more ‘democratic sample’ – elections in
which winners obtain less than 75 per cent. As can be seen, the latter estimation produces
results very similar to the more inclusive models.
Finally, I employ OLS regression (Model Five) in order to test whether successors are
expected to obtain fewer votes. In this model I include all variables from Model Two
apart from Prior Liberalization. If binary models are capable of predicting whether regime
elites win or lose, the OLS model with a similar speciﬁcation should predict votes cast
for the incumbents/successors. If the latter obtain less than 50 per cent in majoritarian
elections, they lose. I expect successors to obtain fewer votes, the unity of opposition
should decrease votes cast for regime representative, growth should improve vote shares,
and lower democracy scores should be associated with the larger shares.
I also included several variables that are expected to inﬂuence votes cast: Political
Constraints (Henisz 2002), Fraud (Beck et al. 2005) and vote cast for the executive in
previous elections (Previous Vote). Political constraints make it more diﬃcult to commit
17fraud and amass large margins. They also account for the overall institutionalization (yet
they also are correlated with Democracy). Reported fraud indicates that votes margins
are probably inﬂated. Votes cast in the past election are included for two reasons: to
control for the typical executive vote in a country as an additional control for the degrees
of democracy, and also because regime elites coordinate election returns on the basis of
past performance so as not to look weaker than in the past. The ratio of votes cast to
votes cast in previous election is 1.03; for incumbents it is 1.1 and for successors it is 0.85:
overall, the executives tend to gain more in each consecutive elections, while successors
gain less than the outgoing rulers. Simpser (2005) and Magaloni (2006) explain possible
reasons behind amassing large margins of victory: to discourage opposition supporters
from voting, establish and signal a long-term dominance and co-opt the opposition. Large
margins can also result from the competition between regional operators as to who could
deliver the largest vote, etc.7
Results of Model 5 indicate that Previous Vote aﬀects the proportion of votes cast for
incumbent at present, Democracy is also highly signiﬁcant: more dictatorial rulers do gain
more votes. Economic Growth is also conducive for gaining more votes in presidencies
throughout the world. Likewise, the fact of Successor running decreases the vote share
received by the representative of the regime.
[FIGURE 2 IS ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 visualizes results. I plot the predicted values of democratic transition during
elections (liberalizing electoral outcome, LEO) and Democracy (Freedom House score, 2
7In 1999 elections in Kazakhstan, regional governors responsible for rallying the voters to polling stations
and ensuring required turnout, apparently competed against each other on who would be able to ‘deliver’
the highest vote for the president. As a result, Nazarbaev gained unprecedented 91.15 per cent of vote
cast. One journalist rather appropriately called him ‘Nursultan the Ninety-Two Percent.’
18years prior to elections, averaged), weighted by votes cast for incumbent/successor. Points
ﬁlled with colour represent observations where democratic transitions actually occur. The
graph shows that the probability of transition is lowest for big-vote-winning incumbents,
they also tend to be more authoritarian. In both categories of incumbents and successors,
there is a slight evidence of a mild negative relationship between levels of Democracy and
probability. Evidently, the model predicts that incumbents will succeed.
Finally, holding all independent variables at their means, I calculate ﬁrst diﬀerences
to assess the inﬂuence of changes in parameters of interest on the probability of demo-
cratic breakthrough (Model 3) and calculate expected values for votes cast for the regime
representatives (Model 5).8 Figure 3 plots the predicted changes in probabilities and val-
ues. The lines represent 95 per cent conﬁdence intervals, and all included parameters are
statistically signiﬁcant.
[FIGURE 3 IS ABOUT HERE]
The overall probability that the dependent variable takes on the value of 1 is 8 percent
(s.e. = 4) holding all predictors at their means. I ﬁnd that all things being equal, the
probability of transition increases by 34.8 per cent (s.e. = 15) when the incumbent does
not run. Interestingly enough, when a successor runs in the hegemonic party regime, the
former still increases the chances for change, but with less magnitude: by 13.3 per cent.
Also, the shift from the closed authoritarian regime to electoral democracy (from 7
to 2.5 on Democracy scale in 2 years prior to election) results in the drop of probability
of transition by 24 per cent. This is a rather extreme counterfactual scenario, as such
signiﬁcant improvement can hardly occur. Note, however, that Benin democratized very
8See King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003.
19rapidly: from FH = 7 in 1989 to 2.5 in 1991. There is no surprise that during this
opening the incumbent president Kerekou suﬀered defeat at elections. Likewise, successful
democratic breakthrough in the region gives the boost for democratization in this region
by 5.5 per cent, but 3 successful ‘stunning’ elections in a row increase it by 31 per cent.
Indeed, electoral revolutions in Slovakia 1998, Croatia 1999, Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003,
Ukraine 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 was inspired by successes of their neighbors.9 All
things being equal, incumbency gives additional 8.3 per cent of votes in a ﬁrst round.
Comparing successors’ performance in hegemonic and non-hegemonic party regimes, the
former are expected to gain 3 per cent more than the latter, however.
Incumbents, Successors and Democratic Transitions
In the theoretical section of this paper, I proposed the hypotheses that successors are
more likely to lose elections than incumbents and this fact increases the probability of
democratic transitions. The results of my statistical analyses support these hypotheses:
successors gain a smaller proportion of votes than incumbents, and their participation in
election increases the chances of democratic transition. Indeed, when an incumbent runs,
breakthrough occurs in only 12 per cent of such elections (8) and does not occur in 88 per
cent (59). When a successor runs, a liberalizing outcome occurs in 52 per cent (12) and
does not occur in 48 per cent (11).
The hypotheses stipulated in the beginning of this paper predicted that the incumbents
should win and successors lose. Since we live in a probabilistic world, the quadrants
representing these outcomes in Figure 1 are not empty. In an ideal world, every time an
9E.g., Eurasian Daily Monitor. 2004, October 13. “Ukrainian Authorities Target Student Youth
Election-Monitoring Groups” 1 (104).
20incumbent runs, there is no democratic change, and every time a successor runs, there is a
change. In other words, the upper left and the lower right quadrants of this ﬁgure should
be empty. In order to test under what conditions theory does not hold, in this section I
focus on outliers: elections when incumbents run and lose, and successors run and win.
Incumbents Run and Lose
Incumbents run and lose only in 12 per cent of cases in the sample (8 out of 67). A
closer look at these elections could reveal what it takes to defeat a standing incumbent in
elections in the developing world. I discard three cases in which presidents either did not
participate in elections or did not lose, even though democratic change occurred (see note to
Figure 1). Altogether, ﬁve incumbent presidents lost: the incumbent president Ion Iliescu
of Romania lost in 1996 (only to retain oﬃce back in 2000); President Noriega of Nicaragua
lost reelection in 1990 (the only Latin American ‘reelection loser’ according to Cheibub and
Przeworski 1999) - only to return to oﬃce in 2006; in Benin the multiparty elections were
introduced after a long one-party rule and incumbent Kerekou quite unexpectedly failed to
win the ﬁrst round of 2001 presidential elections and lost in the second round (to return to
oﬃce in 1996) (Decalo 1997); Slobodan Miloˇ sevi´ c of Yugoslavia lost in 2000 in a democratic
revolution (‘Serbian October’), and President Abdou Diouf of Senegal lost to Abdoulaye
Wade in 2000.
The defeats of Miloˇ sevi´ c in Serbia and of Diouf in Senegal indicate that long-standing
incumbents are extremely diﬃcult to unseat. In the latter case, Diouf has won 4 reelections
as a president with an unlimited mandate since 1981, yet each time with smaller margins.
Finally, in 2000 he lost. ‘Many analysts were predicting that Diouf would prevail again,
with Wade being conﬁrmed as the eternal front-runner among the challengers’ (Ottaway
212003, 101). In February of 2000 Diouf was able to win the ﬁrst round of the presidential
election, yet he was unable to garner the necessary majority of the popular vote required
to prevent a run-oﬀ election. It is very likely that if incumbents fail to win a ﬁrst round,
they fail to win the second, as their failure mobilizes their opposition and signals their
weakness – the opposition became united for a second round only after Diouf failed to win
in a ﬁrst round. The former minister Niasse joined the second-runner Wade in exchange
for the promise of a prime ministerial post. Through a series of political arrangements in
the opposition camp and following a series of protests, the opposition candidate Abdoulaye
Wade was ﬁnally able to defeat President Diouf in a second round.
While these cases indicate that incumbents are not immune to losing, these are also
examples of the extraordinary eﬀorts that are necessary to unseat the standing presidents:
all ﬁve cases can be counted as ‘watershed’ or ‘stunning’ elections (Huntington 1991). It is
easier to defeat successors. One can also view transitions in these elections as the result of
the accumulation of random hazards (Przeworski and Limongi 1997) – the long-standing
rulers could have failed because they encountered more problems and made more errors
than usual — in other 59 elections, incumbents prevail.
Incumbents Do Not Run, Successors Win
There are 11 elections recorded as successors running and winning (the upper left
quadrant). I discard three cases in which either there were no successors or they lost, even
if not to the pro-democratic opposition (see note to Figure 1).
There are eight elections (out of 23, or 35 per cent), which successors won. In 2 cases
the designated successors had a very early start and consolidated their power base in
advance and managed to prevent possible elite splits during succession. In Russia an aging
22and highly unpopular President Yeltsin appointed Prime Minister Putin as his designated
successor in 1999 well in advance of the forthcoming 2000 poll. Then Yeltsin retired three
months prior to the 2000 elections so that Putin became the de facto president for the
crucial pre-election period, and was able to consolidate his power base. In Azerbaijan in
2003, terminally ill incumbent president, Heidar Aliev, began the electoral campaign but
then at the last moment withdrew in favor of his son, Ilham. Having a designated successor
prevented elite splits and uncertainty.10 Like in Russia, Aliev junior had an unusually
early start and had been a de facto incumbent president prior to the vote. Together with
Azerbaijan in 2003, Syria in 2000 represents another case of dynastic succession, in which
Bashar Al-Assad succeeded his father, endorsed by a plebiscite. Elite were assured that
the status quo would remain not only by the family ties between the rulers, but also by
the presence of the hegemonic party.
Likewise, in ﬁve more elections presidential succession was facilitated by a strong hege-
monic party (Mexico 1994, Malawi 2004, Djibouti 1999, Mozambique 2004 and the Zambia
2001). I elaborated on Mexican exceptionalism and the stringent adherence to the no re-
election rule in the theoretical section. In Mexico in 1994 president Salinas honored term
limits and stepped down, like all Mexican presidents had done for 60 years prior to him.
The election of Zedillo ensued, even though he was not the expected successor. In Djibouti,
82-year-old president Gouled stepped down in favor of his nephew, Gulleh, who promptly
became the new ruler. The hegemonic People’s Rally for Progress party ensured a smooth
succession. Likewise, in Malawi, having failed to extend his term, the outgoing president
Muluzi appointed Bingu wa Mutharika, Minister of Economic Planning and Development
and his opponent in 1999 presidential elections, as his successor for 2004 elections, which
10There were reports that the President Aliev was actually dead while running for the Presidency.
Al-Ahram International Edition. 2003, August 7-13. “Like Father, Like Son”. No. 650.
23the latter won.11 (VonDoepp 2005). In Mozambique president Chissano appointed Ar-
mando Guebuzo as his successor and the candidate from the ruling, Frelimo party, and
stepped down, following the victory of Guebuzzo.
In Zambian elections of 2001 the outgoing President Chiluba did not support Mwanawasa,
a former vice president, who was selected as the governing party, MMD’s presidential can-
didate for 2001 elections. The splits within the ruling elite were so severe that two more
former vice presidents, Godfrey Miyanda and General Christon Tembo, ran against each
other and another former vice president, Mwanawasa (Burnell 2002). The designated suc-
cessor was endorsed by the governing party, however, and prevailed.
To sum up, out of eight cases of successors running and ‘winning’ (no democratic
change), six successors won elections with the help of the hegemonic parties and two
were appointed well in advance, so that they could consolidate their early incumbency
advantage. In fact, two were sons of the incumbent presidents. In all eight cases elite splits
did not occur, successors remained in control, displaying all the characteristics of standing
incumbents, and proceeded to win the elections. The opposition failed to coordinate the
collective action and to mobilize for the ‘stunning elections.’ These exceptions suggest that
under certain circumstances, successors do not have to lose and succession can proceed in
an orderly manner. The process of presidential succession seems to be mitigated by the
presence of strong hegemonic parties: institutions ensure the continuation of careers and
policies of regime elites despite the uncertainty of executive turnover (Brownlee 2004).
Strong, hegemonic parties are able to engineer the ex post elite contracting, and the early
delegation of power that signals that successors are in control and de facto incumbents,
facilitates presidential succession.
11Chronicle. 2003, July 7. “Malawi: Dictatorship Defeated!”
24Conclusions and Future Research
Clearly, the absence of incumbents is important for democratic transitions: it increases
the probability of a successful democratic breakthrough by 35 per cent during elections
in presidential regimes. Controlling for other factors, when incumbent presidents are ab-
sent, successors are more likely to lose elections. Thus, they obtain 8 per cent less than
the longer-standing rulers irrespective of the degree of authoritarianism. Successors in
hegemonic-party regimes tend to perform better, however. Because since 1990 partly- and
non-democratic regimes are challenged by the pro-democratic opposition, rather than by
the pro-Soviet, nationalist, fascist or other anti-system forces of the earlier periods, defeat
at elections is very likely to lead to democratization.
The ﬁndings in this paper indicate that we should not neglect the dynamics of succession
in presidential regimes when we try to understand and predict democratic transitions.
Using statistical analyses and a careful examination of all the outlier observations, I found
that the stipulated hypotheses hold: presidential succession does increase the chances for
democratic breakthrough in the developing world. The process of democratic transition
thrives on uncertainty and elite splits. Presidential succession often triggers these splits
and uncertainty, because successors are relatively weak and have yet to consolidate their
incumbency advantage. As the experience of battling with Miloˇ sevi´ c in 2000 and Abdu
Diouf in 2000 suggests, defeating a standing incumbent is possible, but extremely diﬃcult.
Incumbent turnover occurs, however, only if incumbents do not run for one reason or
another. In the sample, 23 elections record executive turnover. Out of these 23 cases, 3
presidents were ousted in coups or forced to resign and could not run, 4 died in oﬃce, 4
stepped down even though they could stand, and 12 presidents stepped down because of
25term limits. In this paper, I treated executive turnover as an independent variable, but
it would be interesting to explore in the future what makes some presidents obey their
constitutions and step down when required, and others to attempt and extend their rule.
Out of those 12 in the sample that honored term limits, two presidents clearly ﬂirted with
the idea of a third term, but in the end stepped down: Chiluba of Zambia and Muluzi of
Malawi.12 In a number of elections turnover did not occur because presidents scrapped
restrictions: for example, in Gabon in 2003 or Togo in 2002. Clearly, what determines
presidential decision-making during succession is something to explore in the future, both
theoretically and empirically.
Term limits can be observed because of a very powerful precedent and the agreement
among elites, like the example of single six-year terms in Mexico illustrates. Recent litera-
ture argues that institutions matter in dictatorships (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Brown-
lee 2004): they can provide guarantees to the groups whose support is often necessary for a
ruler to stay in power, serve as a contract between members of the winning coalition, coopt
potential challengers, etc. Also, rulers could introduce and obey term limits in the process
of self-imposed liberalization and signalling their ‘type’ to the international community.
The succession behaviour and its outcomes have direct eﬀects on the prospects of democ-
racy in many developing countries. To measure the aﬃnity between incumbents and their
successors and to map this aﬃnity to the outcomes of succession is an interesting project
to study in the future. Likewise, the presence of hegemonic parties seems to reduce the
uncertainty and costs of succession in presidential regimes. There are other possible factors
inﬂuencing how succession interacts with transition. Magaloni stipulates that when presi-
dential elections take place concurrently with legislative elections, stakes can be lower for
12Times of Zambia (Lusaka). 1998, October 13. “Will Chiluba Desire Another Third Term.” 13 October
1998; Chronicle. 2003, July 7. “Malawi: Dictatorship Defeated!”; VonDoepp (2005).
26incumbent elites because they can lose presidential oﬃce, but still retain legislative seats
(Magaloni 2006, 231-233). Indeed, I ﬁnd that 60 per cent of democratizing elections in
this sample are concurrent (legislative and presidential), while only 40 per cent of regular
elections are. Further studies should focus on the interaction of incentives and institu-
tions during succession and study which institutions and elite pacts could ease the ex post
contracting in order to ensure transition to and consolidation of democracy in developing
world.
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31Variable Deﬁnitions and Data Sources
Democratic Change (Liberalizing Electoral Outcome) 1 if MPOLITY≥3 and MFH≥1
(democratization) in election year, 55 new presidential elections are added to H&R data.
Vote share Per cent of votes in the 1st/only round, cast for incumbent/successor, DPI.
Successor 0 if incumbent, 1 if successor (incumbent does not run, or president served <
1 year prior to elections). Every eﬀort was made to identify the designated successor in
cases in which incumbents do no run. Table 1 in Appendix lists all incumbent presidents
and their successors.
Opposition Coalition 1 if Opposition united, 0 otherwise. The author followed the
coding by H&R, 55 new obs. are added.
Opposition Mobilization The average number of anti-governmental demonstrations, a
year preceding elections and election year, added from Banks.
Growth GDP growth per capita, per cent, averaged 2 years prior to elections, WDI.
FDI FDI as per cent of GDP, averaged 2 years prior to elections, WDI.
Foreign Aid Aid per capita, averaged 2 years prior to elections, WDI.
Democracy Averaged FH civil liberties score, 2 years prior to elections, FH.
Prior Liberalization0 if FHt−5 >= FHt−1, 1 otherwise, FH.
Hegemonic Party 1 if regime is hegemonic party autocracy at the time of the election,
as coded in Magaloni (2006, 36–41): (1) regularized multiparty competition, (2) the chief
executive and legislature are elected, (3) the incumbent held oﬃce for more than 20 y., (4)
the ruling party never lost elections. I cross-check these regimes and add those coded as
the single-party regimes in Smith (2005, 424).
Regional Transitions Number of transitions (DV = 1) in the region (West Africa,
Middle Africa, South Africa, East Africa, Middle East and North Africa, CEE/NIS, Central
America, South America, and Asia), 3 years prior to an election.
Regional Liberalization Averaged FH score in the region, year preceding election and
election year.
Previous Vote Vote share cast for the winner of the previous elections, DPI.
Political Constraints PolconIII: the feasibility of policy change on the [0, 1] scale, where
0 is the unlimited authority, Henisz (2002).
Electoral Fraud Fraud reported in elections, yes (1) or no (0), DPI.
Data sources: H&R: Howard and Roessler (2006); FH: Freedom House (various years); DPI: Database of
Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001); WDI: World Development Indicators (World Bank); GFD: Global
Financial Data (GFD database); Banks: Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks 2005).



















*Even though the executive turnover and no transition were observed, in 3 cases successors either lost or
there were no successors. In Guinea-Bissau following the coup neither incumbent Veiera nor his successor
participated in elections. In Guatemala of 1990 designated successor Cabrera Hidalgo did not even get
past the ﬁrst round. In Iranian elections of 1997 president Rafsanjani stepped down and his conservative
‘successor’ lost to the ‘reformist’ candidate Khatami. If we discard these 3 cases, the proportion goes
down to 35 per cent (8 elections) **In Peru 2000 the incumbent Fujimori ran for a third term, and,
proper speaking, won. He was subsequently ousted in a series of post-election protests. ‘Rose revolution’
in Georgia in 2003 followed the parliamentary elections in which incumbent did not run. In Ghana in
1996 the opposition made advances in the legislative elections, yet the incumbent president Rawlings won
presidential contest that same year, so this case is not an incumbent’s defeat as such. If we leave out these
3 cases, the proportion changes to 8 per cent (5 elections).
33Table 1: Democratic Transitions During Elections in Presidential Regimes
Logit Regression (1 – 4) OLS (5)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Base with with Party Excluding Vote Share
Model Party & Diﬀusion votes>.75 (OLS)
Successor 2.377*** 3.080*** 2.919*** 2.888*** -8.190**
(.599) (.920) (.766) (.586) (1.636)
Opp. Coalition 1.983** 2.257** 1.719** 1.948*** -3.908
(.870) (.962) (.723) (.705) (2.884)
Opp. Mobilization .462*** .365*** .162 .223 -1.336
(.066) (.048) (.163) (.343) (1.055)
Growth -.049* -.075** -.103** -.123* .419**
(.030) (.025) (.032) (.048) (.155)
Foreign Aid .001 .003 .008 .001 -.021
(.007) (.006) (.009) (.006) (.032)
FDI -.102 -.138 -.118 -.039 -.012
(.117) (.184) (.161) (.074) (.203)
Democracy (FH) -.702** -.873** -.670** -.397* 6.341**
(.356) (.349) (.293) (.233) (1.610)
Prior Liberalization .447 .239 .530 .700 –
(.713) (.742) (.824) (.825)
Hegemonic Party – -2.044** -2.138** -2.375** 2.066
(.951) (.934) (.895) (2.270)
Regional Transitions – – .928** .893** –
(.386) (.438)
Regional Liberalization – – -.749 -.489 –
(.714) (.765)
Previous Vote – – – – .376**
(.075)
Political Constraints – – – – -12.224
(11.493)
Electoral Fraud – – – – 1.906
(2.863)
Intercept -.073 1.014 3.109 1.126 11.661
(1.395) (1.266) (3.276) (3.541) (11.037)
N 90 90 90 60 90
Log-Likelihood -29.195 -26.495 -24.003 -21.703 F = 22.71
Pseudo R2 .39 .44 .50 .43 R2 = .62
Models 1 - 4 estimate the probability of democratic transition during elections, 1990-2004, logit regression,
with robust (cluster-adjusted) standard errors. Model 5 estimates the vote share cast for incumbent or
successor in ﬁrst/only round, OLS regression, with robust (cluster-adjusted) standard errors. *Signiﬁcant
at .1 level, **signiﬁcant at .05 level, *** signiﬁcant at .01 level. Robust (cluster-adjusted) standard
errors in parentheses. Adjustments are made for within-region correlation, regions are speciﬁed as follows:
West Africa, Middle Africa, East Africa, South Africa, Middle East and North Africa, NIS/CEE, Central
America, South America, Asia.
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ﬁ Plot of predicted values of democratic transition during elections and democracy (Freedom House averaged
score, 2 years prior to elections), weighted by votes cast for incumbent/successor in ﬁrst/only round, based
on the results of Model 3. Points ﬁlled with colour represent observations where democratic transitions
actually occur. If they are located above .5 probability line, they are deemed to be predicted correctly.
Larger circles represent larger vote shares, in [23, 99] interval. The graph shows that the probability
of transition is lowest for big-vote-winning authoritarian incumbents. The model predicts 13 transitions
correctly, and fails to predict 7. Overall, the model predict 88 per cent of observations correctly (p> .5
and transition; p< .5 and no transition).
35Figure 3: Simulated Eﬀects on the Dependent Variable
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Simulated eﬀects represent the change in the predicted probability of the dependent variable using Model
3 (predicted probabilities of democratic transition) and Model 5 (expected values of votes cast for presi-
dent/successor in ﬁrst/only round), given changes in particular predictors. For example, the fact of suc-
cessor running in elections (rather than incumbent) increases predicted probability of democratic change
by 34.8 per cent. However, when incumbent runs in the hegemonic party regime, it increases the proba-
bility by only 13 per cent. Likewise, incumbent is expected to obtain 8 per cent more than successor, but
successors hegemonic party system gain 3 more than successors in regular regimes.
36Appendix
Table 1: Incumbents, Successors and Transitions
Transition Incumb. Election Leader Vote Share Prev. Leader
transition incumbent Benin 1991 Kerekou 27.2
no incumbent Burkina Faso 1998 Campaore 87.5
transition successor Cote d’Ivoire1 2000 Guei 32.7 Bedie
no incumbent Gambia 1996 Jammeh 55.76
no incumbent Gambia 2001 Jammeh 52.6
transition incumbent Ghana 1996 Rawlings 58.3
transition successor Ghana 2000 Atta-Mills 44.8 Rawlings
no incumbent Guinea 1998 Conte 56.1
no incumbent Guinea 2003 Conte 95.6
no successor Guinea-Bissau 19992 Kumba Yala 56.11 Vieira
no incumbent Mauritania 1997 Taya 90.1
no incumbent Mauritania 2003 Taya 66.7
no incumbent Niger 2004 Tandja 40.7
no incumbent Nigeria 2003 Obasanjo 61.8
no incumbent Senegal 1993 Diouf 73
transition incumbent Senegal 2000 Diouf 41.6
no incumbent Sierra Leone 2002 Kabbah 70.1
no incumbent Togo 1998 Eyadema 52.1
no incumbent Togo 2003 Eyadema 57.8
no incumbent CAR 1999 Patasse 51.6
no incumbent Cameroon 1997 Biya 92.6
no incumbent Cameroon 2004 Biya 75.2
no incumbent Chad 2001 Deby 67.3
no incumbent Congo 2002 Sassou-Nguesso 89.4
no incumbent Eq. Guinea 1996 Obiang 99
no incumbent Eq. Guinea 2002 Obiang 99
no incumbent Gabon 1998 Bongo 51.18
no successor Djibouti 1999 Guelleh 72.02 Gouled
no incumbent Kenya 1997 D. arap Moi 40.6
transition successor Kenya 2002 Kenyatta 30.6 Moi
no incumbent Malawi 1999 Muluzi 52.4
no successor Malawi 2004 Mutharika 35.9 Muluzi
no incumbent Mozambique 1999 Chissano 52.3
no successor Mozambique 2004 Guebuza 65 Chissano
no incumbent Rwanda 2003 Kagame 95
no incumbent Uganda 1996 Museveni 75.5
no incumbent Uganda 2001 Museveni 74.2
no successor Zambia 20013 Mwanawasa 72.5 Chiluba
no incumbent Zimbabwe 1990 Mugabe 83.5
no incumbent Zimbabwe 1996 Mugabe 92.7
no incumbent Zimbabwe 2002 Mugabe 56.2
no incumbent Algeria 2004 Bouteﬂika 85
no incumbent Egypt 19994 Mubarak 99
no incumbent Iran 1993 Rafsanjani 94.5
Continued on next page
1Table 1: Incumbents, Successors and Transitions (continued)
Transition Incumb. Election Leader Vote Share Prev. Leader
no successor Iran 1997 Khatami 63.3 Rafsanjani
no incumbent Sudan 2000 Ahmad al-Bashir 86.5
no incumbent Syria 19994 Assad 99.9
no successor Syria 20004 B. Assad 99
no incumbent Tunisia 1999 Ben Ali 99
no incumbent Tunisia 2004 Ben Ali 94.5
no incumbent Armenia 1996 Ter-Petrosian 83
transition successor Armenia 1998 Kocharian 52 Ter-Petrosyan
no incumbent Armenia 2003 Kocharyan 48.3
no incumbent Azerbaijan 1993 H. Aliev 99
no incumbent Azerbaijan 1998 H. Aliev 77.6
no successor Azerbaijan 2003 H. Aliev 76.8 Aliev
no incumbent Belarus 2001 Lukashenko 75.6
no incumbent Belarus 20045 Lukashenko 79.4
no incumbent Croatia 1997 Tudjman 57
transition successor Croatia 2000 Granic 26.7 Tudjman
no incumbent Georgia 2000 Shevarnadze 40.1
transition incumbent Georgia 20036 Shevarnadze 42.2
no incumbent Kazakhstan 1999 Nazarbaev 81
no incumbent Kyrgyzstan 1995 Akayev 71.6
no incumbent Kyrgyzstan 2000 Akaev 74.5
no incumbent Romania 1992 Iliescu 85.1
transition incumbent Romania 1996 Iliescu 47.34
no incumbent Russia 1996 Yeltsin 35.79
no successor Russia 2000 Putin 50.6 Yeltsin
no incumbent Russia 2004 Putin 71.1
no incumbent Tajikistan 1999 Rakhmonov 97
no incumbent Ukraine 1999 Kuchma 38
transition successor Ukraine 2004 Yanukovich 41.4 Kuchma
no incumbent Uzbekistan 2000 Karimov 91.9
no incumbent Yugoslavia 1996 Milosevic 57.46
transition incumbent Yugoslavia 2000 Milosevic 37.8
transition successor Dominican Rep. 19967 Reynado 36 Balaguer
no successor Guatemala 1990 Hidalgo 38.65 Cerezo
transition successor Guatemala 19958 Arzu 42.6 Carpio
no successor Mexico 1994 Zedillo 50.39 Salinas
transition successor Mexico 2000 Labastido 36.1 Zedillo
transition incumbent Nicaragua 1990 Daniel Ortega 45
no incumbent Peru 1995 Fujimori 44.52
transition incumbent Peru 20009 Fujimori 49.8
transition successor Peru 20019 Paniagua 49.87 Fujimori
no incumbent Venezuela 200410 Chavez 59
transition successor Sri Lanka 1994 Dissanayake 35.9 Premadasa
no incumbent Sri Lanka 1999 Kumaratunga 62.2
no incumbent Taiwan 1996 Lee Teng-hui 54
transition successor Taiwan 200011 Lian Chan 23.1 Lee Teng-hui
Continued on next page
2Table 1: Incumbents, Successors and Transitions (continued)
Transition Incumb. Election Leader Vote Share Prev. Leader
1President Bedie (1993-99) was overthrown in a coup in 1999. Military junta encouraged Gu´ e¨ i to run in
elections as its candidate but he lost. 2Military coup of 1999 ousted president Veiera. 3Although the party
of President Chiluba - MMD - elected Mwanawasa as its presidential candidate for 2001 elections, Chiluba
did not endorse Mwanawasa. 4Plebiscites (to endorse the candidate). 52004 Parliamentary elections and
a third term referendum. 62003 Parliamentary elections, following which the incumbent was ousted. Vote
share is reported for the incumbent parties. 7President Balaguer and his party supported Reynado in
the ﬁrst round of 1996 elections. 8Arzu defeated Carpio, who was an interim president (1993-95) after
President Elias and his Vice-President were forced to resign after constitutional violations. 9Fujimori
was the winner of 2000 elections, even though democratic transition ensued after corruption allegations.
Fujimori did not have a successor in 2001 elections. 102004 Recall referendum. 11The outgoing president
Lee failed to ensure the victory of his successor. It appears that he helped the opposition candidate to
win instead. In 2000 Freedom House rated Taiwan as democracy, yet this election is included as it was the
ﬁrst alternation in power in Taiwan.
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